5 edition of Pre-electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments found in the catalog.
July 24, 2007
by Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
Written in English
|The Physical Object|
|Number of Pages||228|
Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments, Baden-Baden, Nomos, , p. 14 See Warren L. Miller and Myles Mackie, 'The Electoral Cycle and the Asymmetry of Government and Opposition Popularity: An Alternative Model of the Relationship. See, for example, M. Debus, Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments (Baden-Baden: Nomos, ), pp. 43–7; M. Debus and J. Müller, ‘Government Formation after the Federal Election: The Remake of the Christian–Liberal Coalition under New Patterns of Party Competition’, German Politics 20/1 ( Cited by:
Botswana’s electoral outcomes have never culminated in the formation of a coalition government. However, the opposition has tried various forms of pre-electoral coalitions but with partial success. The paper argues that although coalitions or alliances present an opportunity to the opposition, the challenge in the main has been disagreements. Research on comparative voter turnout has produced a puzzling set of findings: proportional representation (PR) electoral systems increase turnout, but multiparty systems decrease turnout. This paper provides new evidence to resolve these conflicting.
An electoral alliance is an association of political parties or individuals that exists solely to stand in elections. Other similar terms are bipartisan electoral agreement, electoral pact electoral agreement, electoral coalition or electoral bloc.. Each of the parties within the alliance has its own policies but chooses temporarily to put aside differences in favour of common goals and. Alliance Politics in Pakistan final distribution of seats or votes is known. In this case no explicit information about coalition membership or leadership is given to the public before elections. This type of alliance may also occur when the previous government File Size: KB.
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Additional Physical Format: Online version: Debus, Marc. Pre-electoral alliances, coalition rejections, and multiparty governments. Baden-Baden: Nomos, DEBUS, Marc, Pre-electoral alliances, coalition rejections, and multiparty governments [Dissertation].
Konstanz: University of Konstanz. Auflage. Baden-Baden. 2 A multiparty system is defined by electoral competition between several parties; a bipolar system i ; 4 We will consider pre-electoral alliances as non-formal coalitions, i.e.
as coalitions ‘[reflecting] informal patterns of cooperation among parties [that] tend to devise electoral seat adjustments in constituencies that maximize their probability of electoral success’ (Kugler Cited by: 1.
Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Comparative Perspective: A Test of Existing Hypotheses Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments able to identify the utility.
Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction. In: Controlling the Electoral Marketplace.
Political Campaigning and Communication. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, Coalition formation, assertiveness and tactical programmatic Approaches in analysing payoffs in coalition governments Institutional and semi-institutional accounts on coalition politics The institutional perspective On Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending.
Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending. pre-electoral alliances occur nearly as frequently as post-election coalitions.
A study of the number of African countries with pre-electoral alliances and/ or coalition governments (as opposed to single-party governments) in the period up to October is quite revealing.
When one excludes countries in whichCited by: 2. Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments Article in European Journal of Political Research 23(1):1 - 33 May with 54 Reads How we measure 'reads'Author: Norman Schofield.
Coalition governments have always been rare in Africa (Oyugi ). At the pre-electoral alliance formation, resulting in a range of dynamics and patterns. QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF ELECTORAL ALLIANCES IN AFRICA Arriola’s () book on multiethnic coalitions in Africa is Cited by: 3.
Debus M () Pre-electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments. Nomos, Baden-Baden CrossRef Google Scholar Gschwend T () Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from : Michael Herrmann.
A distinctive feature of the book is that it explores the impact of intra-party politics at different levels of government: national, local and EU.
This offers the opportunity to investigate existing theories of coalition formation in new political settings. Recent studies show that pre-electoral commitments and the ideological distance between parties influence government formation.
But do pre-electoral pacts or rejections of party combinations really have an independent impact on the outcome of the government formation game.
Which policy areas matter when parties agree to build a coalition. This paper addresses these questions by Cited by: McLean, Ian (): ”England Does Not Love Coalitions”: Th e Most Misused Political Quotation in the Book; in: Government and Opposition, 47, S.
3– Google Scholar Moury, Catherine (): Coalition agreement and party mandate, in: Party Politics, 17, S. Cited by: 6. Fianna Fáil Still Dominant in the Coalition Era: The Irish General Election of May Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments This book examines Author: Paul L Mitchell.
; Marc Debus, Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments, Baden-Badenp. f., 14 Franz Urban Pappi/Alexander Herzog/Ralf Schmitt, Koalitionssignale und die Kombination von Erst- und Zweitstimme bei den Bundestagswahlen bis. Pre-electoral alliances, coalition rejections, and multiparty governments.
Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos. Multiparty government the politics of coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor: Coalition government membership in West European parliamentary by: Explaining coalition-bargaining outcomes: Evidence from Austria, – Show all authors.
Katrin Schermann. Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Google Scholar Müller, WC, Meyer, TM () Meeting the challenges of representation and accountability in multi-party by: Coalitions and Elections Alliances.
Political parties form a pre-electoral coalition by publicly stating that they intend to form a government with each other if they receive enough votes in the up-coming elections. In many cases, however, political parties contest the elections completely independently, and voters therefore do not have any.
Finally, pre-electoral coalitions are not rare. There were pre-electoral coalitions in 19 West European countries between and 3 Fig. 1 provides summary information about these pre-electoral coalitions by illustrating the number of electoral coalitions per year, the average number of parties participating in each coalition per election, and the number of electoral coalitions that Cited by:.
Debus, Marc. Pre‐Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments. Baden‐ Baden: Nomos.
Artikel in Fachzeitschriften (peer‐reviewed) Bäck, Hanna/Marc Debus. “Personalized versus partisan representation in the speeches of migrant.The Austrian election: Winter of discontent Article in West European Politics 19(3) December with 2 Reads How we measure 'reads'.Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments Evidence from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands by Marc Debus Paperback, Pages, Published by Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft ISBNISBN: